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Abstract
Communication is an important aspect of human life, allowing us to powerfully coordinate our behaviour with that of
others. Boiled down to its mere essentials, communication entails transferring a mental content from one brain to another.
Spoken language obviously plays an important role in communication between human individuals. Manual gestures
however often aid the semantic interpretation of the spoken message, and gestures may have played a central role in the
earlier evolution of communication. Here we used the social game of charades to investigate the neural basis of gestural
communication by having participants produce and interpret meaningful gestures while their brain activity was measured
using functional magnetic resonance imaging. While participants decoded observed gestures, the putative mirror neuron
system (pMNS: premotor, parietal and posterior mid-temporal cortex), associated with motor simulation, and the temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ), associated with mentalizing and agency attribution, were significantly recruited. Of these areas only
the pMNS was recruited during the production of gestures. This suggests that gestural communication relies on a
combination of simulation and, during decoding, mentalizing/agency attribution brain areas. Comparing the decoding of
gestures with a condition in which participants viewed the same gestures with an instruction not to interpret the gestures
showed that although parts of the pMNS responded more strongly during active decoding, most of the pMNS and the TPJ
did not show such significant task effects. This suggests that the mere observation of gestures recruits most of the system
involved in voluntary interpretation.
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Introduction
Communication is an important aspect of human life, allowing
us to powerfully coordinate our behaviour with that of others.
Boiled down to its mere essentials, communication entails
transferring a mental content from one brain to another. Spoken
language obviously plays an important role in communication
between human individuals. Manual gestures however often aid
the semantic interpretation of the spoken message [1,2,3,4,5], and
gestures may have played a central role in the earlier evolution of
communication [6,7,8]. Therefore we will examine here the neural
substrates of gestural communication in humans. Although this
question has received less attention in the field of neuroscience
than spoken language, two potentially complementary processes
have been implicated in the perception and/or production of
gestures: simulation and mentalizing [9,10,11].
The concept of simulation has received a surge of popularity
since the discovery of mirror neurons in macaque monkeys
[12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19]. These neurons are active not only while
the monkey performs an action (e.g. shelling a peanut), but also
while the monkey sees or hears a similar action. Mirror neurons
havebeen found in the ventral premotor and inferior parietal cortex
of the monkey. However, it remains unclear whether other regions
of the monkey brain contain mirror neurons for actions, because
extensive single cell recording during both action execution and
observation have so far not been performed outside of the pre-
motor and inferior parietal lobule. Evidence for a similar system in
humans has been derived from neuroimaging and transcranial
magnetic stimulation studies [20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28], with the
former showing that a network of areas is active both while people
perform actions in the scanner and while they view or hear other
people’s actions. In humans, this system seems to include the dorsal
premotor, somatosensory, cerebellar and posterior temporal cortex
in addition to the ventral premotor, inferior frontal gyrus and
inferior parietal lobule [21,29]. These are the likely homologues of
the aforementioned regions of the monkey [30,31]. This extended
set of areas can be called the putative Mirror Neuron System
(pMNS) inordertoemphasizethat ifa voxelinanfMRIexperiment
is involved in both execution and observation, the neurons within
these voxels can, but do not have to, be mirror neurons [21,32]:
different populations of neurons within the same voxel could play
the lead role during observation and execution. This caveat means
that functional neuroimaging findings have to be interpreted with
care: the fact that a region involved in action observation and
execution is recruited during the processing of stimuli X might be
suggestive of the fact that processing X involves ‘simulation’ (i.e. the
recruitment of motor programs ‘as if’ the participant were
producing these gestures him/herself) but it is not a guarantee that
processing X truly depends on mirror neurons or simulation [33].
Neuroimaging therefore needs to ask questions in terms of brain
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6801regions (are regions of the pMNS involved?), and not in terms of
cognitive processes involved (is simulation involved?): the former
can be empirically measured using neuroimaging, the latter only
tentatively suggested [34].
The discovery of mirror neurons has lead to the idea that we
understand, at least in part, the goal-directed actions of others
such as grasping and manipulating objects by activating our own
motor and somatosensory representations of similar actions
[15,16,19,22,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46] as if we had
performed similar actions. This ‘as if’ component is why this
process is called simulation. It seems that simulation occurs
simultaneously at different levels of representations [11]: strictly
and broadly congruent mirror neurons in the monkey for
instance represent details of an action and the goal of an action,
respectively and simultaneously [15], and experiments in human
support the notion that both the details (TMS) and goals [32,39]
of actions are simulated. Whether the same system is involved in
perceiving communicative gestures has been much less investigated.
Several lesion studies have investigated the neural basis of
gesture production and perception in the context of apraxia. This
is a disorder in which patients have difficulty with the control of
action, including impairment in the production of gestures. In
ideational apraxia, patients have preserved basic motor skills, but if
asked to mimic the use of tools (e.g. show me how you would use a
hammer to hammer a nail), they fail to produce the correct actions
[47]. The ability to mimic is therefore traditionally used as a
localizer for areas related to apraxia [48]. These studies have
shown that the normal production of gestures requires an intact
left posterior parietal lobe, including the parietal node of the
pMNS [49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56]. More recently, Montgomery,
Isenberg, & Haxby [57] use a functional neuroimaging study to
show that observing and producing communicative hand gestures
activated the superior temporal sulcus, inferior parietal lobule and
frontal operculum – a set of regions that corresponds to those of
the pMNS. A limitation of this well controlled study is the fact that
the participants had no genuine communicative intent: they
produced pre-trained gestures in response to words (e.g. ‘‘thumbs
up’’) in the production condition, and passively observed
stereotyped short movie clips of hand gestures in the observation
condition. In addition, the authors intermixed imitation trials with
passive observation trials. This may have lead to activations in
motor production areas during gesture observation trials simply as
a covert rehearsal of the motor programs that will later be needed
for imitation. Overall, this task may therefore differ in important
ways from the real life processes involved. For example, if one is in
a foreign country, does not speak the language, and has only
gestures to ask where to find a good restaurant. Would such a
situation also primarily recruit the pMNS? Would other regions
become important, including those involved in asking yourself
what the other person is thinking, i.e. mentalizing areas?
As e to fb r a i nr e g i o n sh a sb e e ni m p l i c a t e di ns u c hr e f l e c t i o na b o u t
the mental state of others. These areas include the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC, in particular the paracingulate gyrus) and the temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ) [58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71].
Gallagher & Frith [72] compared the recognition of hand gestures
expressing internal states (e.g. I feel cold) with those expressing a
command (e.g. come here!). They additionally contrasted a recognition
condition (was the gesture positive?) against an observation condition
(which hand moved higher in the movie?). In particular, they report in
the results and their Table 4 that the left anterior paracingulate cortex
(putative BA32), thought to be a key node of the putative ‘theory of
mind’ network (pToM area) appeared in an interaction contrast
(recognizing expressive gestures – observing expressive gestures –
recognizing orders+observing orders), and interpreted this finding as
evidence for ToM involvement in interpreting gestures that express
inner states. From the evidence presented in the report however, this
interpretation is problematic, as they also report in the results and
their Table 3, that the left anterior paracingulate cortex (putative
BA32) is more active while observing gestures compared to recognizing
them. While it is uncertain from the tables alone whether overlapping
regions of the paracingulate cortex were present in these two contrasts,
the paracingulate cortex was absent from the contrast recognizing –
observing. This would be difficult to reconcile with the area being
responsible for recognition. The involvement of ToM regions in
gesture recognition therefore remains uncertain. In addition, although
the TPJ is reliably recruited by tasks requiring mentalizing
[61,63,68,69], it is unlikely that this region specializes in attributing
mental states to others: it is likely that it serves domain general
functions relating to attention [73] and/or comparing sensory input
with motorcommands [74] which happen also to be important during
mental state attribution.
The study described here explicitly investigates the role of both
the pMNS and pToM areas by pioneering the use of a well-
established gestural communication task into the field of neurosci-
ence: the game of ‘charades’. We recorded brain activity while
(romantically involved) couples played this game with each other.
One partner would first be scanned while gesturing an action or
object into a camera in the knowledge that his partner would later
need to guess the action/object based on his recorded gestures. The
other partner was to be scanned while decoding the gestures. The
roles were then reversed. This allowed us to measure brain activity
while people invent and execute gestures suitable to communicate a
complex concept to another person, and while another person is
decoding these gestures to guess the original concept. In addition,
we examined if the brain activity recorded during this natural form
of communication was specific for a communicative setting. We
replayedthemoviesoftheirpartner’sgesturestoeachparticipanton
a separate day, but this time, did not ask them to guess what their
partner was trying to tell them. All participants reported finding the
game verymotivating,and experiencedthe experiment asa genuine
and spontaneous form of communication.
Based on the idea that the pMNS might map the communi-
cative actions of others onto the programs for producing similar
actions, we hypothesized that parts of the areas involved in
generating gestures would also become activated during the
observation of communicative actions. To examine if this system
overlaps with the pMNS for goal-directed actions, we examined if
the pMNS as defined in previous experiments [39] becomes active
both during gesture production and observation. Furthermore,
several studies have shown the involvement of the TPJ and mPFC
in tasks where people have to explicitly infer the mental states of
another person. We therefore examined whether these pToM
areas are involved during the charades game. Activity during
gesture production may reflect a theory-of-mind of how the
partner might interpret the gestures, and activity during gesture
interpretation may reflect a theory-of-mind of what the partner
might have meant while generating the gestures. pMNS and
pToM areas could complement each other during the charades
task [9,10,11]. The pMNS areas have been shown to be relatively
stimulus driven independent of the task [e.g. 9,75], while pToM
areas seem more recruited during tasks that explicitly direct
peoples minds to the mental states of others [9]. This line of
reasoning would predict that pMNS areas would respond during
the charades game and the control condition because they
involved similar stimuli and motor actions. However, the pToM
areas might respond during the charades game because this
encourages mental state attribution but not during the control
condition, which does not.
Charades: Role of MNS and ToM
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Participants
Twelve couples (total: 24 participants) were scanned while
playing the game charades. The mean age of the participants was
27.563.8 years. Each couple consisted of a man and a woman
involved in a romantic relationship for at least 6 months. As in
previous studies on emotional empathy [76], we included this
criterion not to study romantic relations specifically but to maximise
the social relevance of this experiment because we expected couples
to be more motivated, more at ease, and to have a better or faster
understanding of each other’s gestures than a strangers do.
Participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire about their
neurological and medical history including whether they had metal
objects in their body. This is a standard procedure to ensure the
safetyofthe participantswhilst inthe scanner.Participantswerealso
asked not to drink coffee before scanning commenced. The
participants freely consented to participating in the study by signing
an informed consent form and were scaled for their right-
handedness on the Edinburgh Righthandedness scale [77]. This
entire study was approved by the Medical Ethics Committee of the
University Medical Center Groningen (2007/080).
Task/Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of two separate sessions on different
days. In the first session, the couple was required to play the game of
charades. In the second, detailed anatomical scans and a control
condition were acquired. For the game of charades, participants
took turns goinginto thescanner, alternating gesturingand guessing
of words.Words wereeither objects (for example nutcracker, watch,
pencil sharpener) or actions (for example painting, knitting, shaving,
see Tab. 1). Each participant performed two gesture and two guess
runs in which they gestured and guessed 14 words in total (7 per
run). The set of words used was the same for each couple, but word
order was randomized between participants. After the last gesture-
session, a T1 image was acquired.
Gesture run. During a gesture run, the participant was
presented with a word on the screen and was instructed to
communicate this word to his or her partner by means of gestures.
Every word had to be gestured for 90 seconds. Prior to scanning
participants were trained not to repeat the same gesture over and
over again, but to keep generating new gestures to provide their
partner with multiple sources of information. The participant
could see how much time he/she needed to keep gesturing by a
progress bar on the screen. A fixation cross was presented for 20 s
after each word, which served as our baseline. The gestures were
recorded from the control room of the MR-scanner with a video
camera (Sony DSR-PDX10P). After the participant had gestured
seven words, he/she was taken out of the scanner and went into
the waiting room, while his/her partner went into the scanner to
guess what he/she had gestured. During this changeover, the
experimenter cut the recording of the gestures into movies of 90 s
in which the participant gestured a word (see supplementary
information for an example of a gesture recording, movie S1). To
ensure that the movies were cut at exactly the moment the word
was presented to the gesturing participant, the stimulus computer’s
sound card emitted a sound at the beginning of word presentation.
The output of the sound card was connected to the audio input of
the video camera, thus allowing the auditory signal to serve as a
marker for cutting. To minimize the amount of head motion in the
participants, the upper arms of the participant were fixed to the
bed by means of a Velcro strap band. This left the participants free
to gesture with their lower arms, hand, and fingers, which was
sufficient to ensure 86% percent correct gesture recognition.
Guess run. During a guess run, the participant was shown
the movies that were recorded in the gesture run of their partner.
The task they had to perform was to guess what their partner was
trying to gesture to them. Participants were asked to consider the
gestures for at least 50 seconds before committing to a specific
interpretation of the gestures. This was done to ensure at least 50
seconds of data in each trial to examine the time course of activity
(i.e. is brain activity in region X sustained for as long as
participants are interpreting the gestures?). This was done by
showing a progress bar under the movie, changing from red to
green after 50 seconds, indicating the beginning of the period (50–
90 s post stimulus onset) during which participants could decide on
their interpretation of the gestures, whenever they felt confident.
After the button press with which the participants indicated to be
ready to respond, a multiple choice menu was presented. In this
menu they had to choose the correct word from five alternatives.
One of the alternatives was always ‘none of the above’ and the
correct answer was always present in the multiple-choice menu.
The correct answer was never the option ‘none of the above’. This
marked the end of a trial. Two consecutive trials were separated by
20 seconds of a white fixation cross against a black background,
which served as our baseline.
Passive observation run. As a control condition for the
guess run, the participants watched the movies again which they
had seen during the guessing condition. This time, they were
instructed not to guess what was gestured, but only to passively
view them. To keep the run exactly the same as the original guess
run, the movie would stop at the moment the participant during
the original run had pushed the button. The same multiple-choice
menu would appear and the participant had to answer again. This
time, however, they had to select the word written in green letters.
The green word was the correct answer. A fixation cross was
presented between two consecutive trials for 20 seconds and served
as our baseline.
Data Acquisition
Functional imaging data was recorded with a Philips 3.0 T MR
scanner, using gradient echo planar imaging (EPI). T2* weighted
images revealed changes in blood oxygen level. Repetition time was
1.33 seconds. The whole brainwasscanned in 28 (axial) sliceswitha
thicknessof 4.5 mm.In the first session, a fast structural image (‘‘fast
anatomy’’) was acquired of the participant’s brain, while in the
second session an additional structural image of higher resolution
was acquired. Both were structural, T1-weighted images.
Data Analysis/Statistical Analysis
Data were analyzed using the Statistical Parametric Mapping
Software, version 2 (SPM2). EPI data were corrected for slice
Table 1. Action and object words used in the game.
Actions Objects
peel fruit fold nutcracker telephone
ride a bike drive a car pencil sharpener winding stairs
shuffle cards play the piano pistol ashtray
polish nails squeeze fruit electric eel bow
juggle paint watch handcuffs
knit light fireworks board game glove
throw a snowball shave canoe cork screw
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.t001
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EPI and segmented, the normalization parameters to normalize
the gray-matter segment onto the MNI gray-matter template were
determined, and applied to all the EPI images. Normalized EPI
images were then smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 10 mm.
Three general linear models were estimated: one for the gesturing,
one for the guessing and one for the passive observation sessions.
All words, whether they were actions or objects, guessed correctly
or incorrectly, were modelled together in one condition. The
predictor in the gesture run consisted of the whole period during
which the gesture was executed (90 s). In the active guessing and
passive observation runs two predictors were included in the
general linear model: (a) the period in which the movie was shown
until button press and (b) from button-press until the participant
had given the answer. All predictors were convolved with the
hemodynamic response function. Each participant’s mean param-
eter estimates were then tested at the second level (one-sampled t-
test). Activations are displayed on a mean anatomical image of all
participants (see Fig. 1). To examine differences between object
words and action words, the data was also modelled using separate
predictors for the two categories but the contrasts ‘guessing
objects–guessing actions’, and the reverse contrast, were not
significant at p,0.05 (FDR corrected) in any voxel. Therefore
only analyses using a single predictor are reported here. The same
applies to the gesture analyses. To control for head motion, we
included six motion parameters as covariates of no interest
(translation and rotation in x, y and z directions) and excluded four
participants, who moved more than the voxel size
(3.563.564.5 mm). Thus, the analyses and results presented in
this paper are based on 20 participants.
Comparisons Guessing vs Passive Observation
Given that passive observation always had to be acquired after
guessing, differences between these conditions could in theory be
linked, amongst others, to systematic differences in the MR-signal
across sessions. We examined this possibility by calculating
average global maps for each participant (i.e. a contrast with ones
in the last columns of the SPM design matrix for the two sessions).
These maps were compared in a paired t-test. There were no
significant differences at p,0.05 (FDR corrected).
Localizing shared circuits
We define shared circuits as those voxels that are active both
during an execution and an observation condition. This was done
by thresholding the group-level analysis of the gesturing condition
(vs. passive baseline) at p,0.001 (uncorrected) to create a binary
map (all above-threshold voxels have the value 1 and all the other
have the value 0) and applying this image as a mask in the second
level analysis of guessing or passive observation.
Putative Mirror Neuron System ROIs
The areas which together form the mirror neuron system were
defined based on a previous study done in our lab with 16
participants [39]. In this study, healthy participants observed and
performed goal-directed hand actions. The subset of areas that are
active both during the execution and the observation condition
form the pMNS. The areas included a section of the ventral-and
dorsal premotor cortex, the parietal lobe (including Brodmann
Area (BA) 2 and the cortex along the intraparietal sulcus and the
supramarginal gyrus) and the middle temporal gyrus (see Fig. 2 for
location and size of the rois).
Figure 1. Activation maps rendered on mean anatomy. Activation maps rendered on the mean anatomy of all 20 subjects. (A–D) Main effects
guessing-baseline, passive observation-baseline, gesture-baseline, guessing-passive observation. (E) Areas similarly activated during guessing and
passive observation (i.e. guessing-baseline p,0.001 & passive observation-baseline p,0.001 & guessing-passive observation p.0.001). (F–I) A, B, D
and E, each masked inclusively with C. All images are thresholded at t=3.58 which corresponds to an uncorrected p#0.001. All voxels also survive
false discovery rate (fdr) correction p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.g001
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The medial prefrontal cortex and the temporo-parietal junction
are considered typical theory-of-mind areas. We included both
these areas in our analyses. We based the ROIs in the medial
prefrontal cortex on the review article of Amodio & Frith [78] in
which different tasks are outlined that lead to activation in this
area. Based on this meta-analysis, we drew our ROI in the anterior
rostral medial frontal cortex. Activations in this region are
associated with mentalizing, person-perception and self-knowl-
edge. This roughly corresponds to Brodmann area 10. We used
the Talairach coordinates from that article to hand-draw a
quadrilateral ROI (from (22,34,5) and (22,26,15) to (22,71,5)
and (22,55,44) respectively). This triangular shape started
medially (at X=62) and extended laterally 13 mm to cover the
grey matter (until X=615). To fit the ROI in the best possible
way to our participants’ data, we multiplied this hand drawn
image with a thresheld mask (.0.3) of the mean grey matter
segment that was obtained through segmenting the brain of each
individual participant.
In a similar fashion we defined the temporal parietal junction on
the basis of coordinates mentioned in Mitchell [73]. Mitchell [73]
gives an overview of all different peak coordinates associated with
the temporal parietal junction. To construct our ROI, we
calculated the mean of these three coordinate-pairs ((54,251,18),
(54,254,24), (60,257,15)) and used this as the centre point of a
sphere with a radius of 10 mm sphere. Again, we multiplied this
with the mean grey matter segment to exclude out-of-brain voxels
as much as possible. For the location and sizes of these regions of
interest, see Figure 3.
Calculating the finite impulse response for the ROIs
For each ROI, we extracted the average BOLD response
around two events of interest: the onset of a gesture and the
moment the button was pushed when the word was guessed.
During guessing and passive observation 28 peri-stimulus timebins
were extracted, in which each bin had the same length as the
repetition time (1.33 s). The signal was extracted from the period
commencing 8 bins before gesture onset and continuing until 20
bins following it. The same was done for the button press,
including 20 bins before and 8 bins after. During gesturing, the
average BOLD response was extracted for the whole period in
which the gesture was performed, starting at 8 bins before the
onset and lasting for 84 bins. The MarsBar toolbox in SPM2 was
used for this extraction [79]. This modeling resulted in para-
stimulus time histograms, which show the development of brain
activity over time (see Fig. 2–3).
Thresholding
All final whole brain analysis results are thresheld at p,0.001
(uncorrected). Only clusters that additionally survived a false
discovery rate correction at p,0.05 are reported. This means that
all whole brain results presented in this manuscript survive fdr
correction at p,0.05, but are presented at p,0.001 (uncorrected)
because this turned out to be the most stringent of the two. Note
that in the case of masking, the correction is only applied after the
masking. Given that the mPFC failed to show significant activation
at these thresholds, we additionally performed a small volume
corrected analysis at p,0.05 within the volume defined as our
mPFC ROI to challenge our negative findings.
Figure 2. ROI analysis results for the pMNS areas. Locations and sizes of the pMNS ROI (center) together with their parameter estimates for
each condition (bar graphs). Curves show the peri-stimulus time histogram for each condition in each ROI. For gesturing, the whole period of
gesturing is plotted, from 8 volumes before the onset of the gesture until 8 volumes after the gesture has stopped. During both guessing and passive
observation, the begin period (8 volumes before onset of the movie of the gesture until 20 volumes after) and the end period (20 volumes before
button press until 8 volumes after) are plotted in the same graph, with the interruption due to the participants responding after variable amounts of
time. See centre legend for further details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.g002
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doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.g003
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any difference with p,0.05. This was done for the reader to have
the freedom to challenge negative findings at a permissive
threshold (p,0.05), while at the same time providing more
stringent evidence for the key positive results.
Results
Behavioural Results
During guessing the participants were asked to consider each
movie for at least 50 seconds after which they could push the
button when they thought they knew what was being gestured to
enter the multiple-choice menu. The average latency to response
was 58 seconds. Participants were equally accurate on both
categories: 88% of the object words were guessed correctly against
85% of the action words (t (41)=20.79, p..43). We did not find a
significant difference between the two types of gestures, neither in
terms of latency to respond (58 s611 s for action and 59 s612 s
for object words, t(330)=21.33, p..18) nor in terms of accuracy
(6.1360.74 sd correct out of 7 action and 5.9261.05 sd correct
our of 7 object words, t(41)=20.79, p..43). Words that were
guessed incorrectly were watched significantly longer than words
that were guessed correctly: 58 s611 s for the 289 correct guesses
versus 65 s614 s for the 47 incorrect guesses (t (56)=23.48,
p,.001).
Whole Brain fMRI Results
Main effects of guessing. Activation clusters during
guessing compared to baseline are shown in Table S1 and
Figure 1A. Of particular interest were the clusters of activity found
along the precentral gyrus (BA 6) and extending into the inferior
frontal gyrus (BA 44 and 45), in the middle and superior temporal
areas (including the TPJ), the primary somatosensory cortex (BA 2
in particular) and the supramarginal gyri. Inspection of the medial
wall (see Figure 4) revealed activations in the superior medial gyrus
in what Amodio and Frith [78] call the posterior section of the
rostral medial frontal cortex but not in the anterior section
associated with theory-of-mind (our mPFC ROI). During this
condition, reductions in the BOLD signal were found in the
precuneus, right insula, and bilaterally the angular gyrus and the
operculum (OP 1 to 4). There were no differences in activation
when object words are compared with action words or vice versa
(not shown).
Main effects of passive observation. Table S2 and
Figure 1B show activation clusters during passive observation
compared to passive baseline. Clusters of activity were found in
locations very similar to those during active guessing, including BA
6, 44, 45, 2, middle and superior temporal areas (including the
TPJ), and supramarginal gyri. Inspection of the medial wall (see
Figure 4) revealed activations in the superior medial gyrus and
adjacent middle cingulate gyrus in what Amodio and Frith [78]
call the posterior section of the rostral medial frontal cortex but not
in the anterior section associated with theory-of-mind (our mPFC
ROI). Reductions in the BOLD signal were found in the
precuneus, the caudate nucleus and two small clusters in the
cerebellum.
Main effects of gesturing. All activation clusters during
gesturing compared to a passive baseline are shown in Table S3
and Figure 1C. Notably, clusters of activity were found in the
primary, pre- and supplementary motor areas (BA 4a/p and 6),
BA 44 and 45. Both inferior and superior parietal lobules were
involved, together with somatosensory cortices and the middle and
superior temporal gyri (including the TPJ). Inspection of the
medial wall (see Figure 4) revealed activations in the superior
Figure 4. Activation maps rendered on medial wall of mean anatomy. Same as Fig. 1, but activations are now shown on the left (x=25) and
right (x=5) medial wall of the mean anatomy of the 20 subjects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.g004
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Amodio and Frith [78] call the posterior section of the rostral
medial frontal cortex but not in the anterior section associated
with theory-of-mind (our mPFC ROI). Instead, the most anterior
sections show evidence of reduced BOLD relative to baseline.
Extensive clusters were found in the precuneus, the angular gyrus
bilateral, the medial prefrontal cortex and the left temporal pole,
which were more active during the baseline than during gesturing.
Additional reductions in BOLD signal were found in the more
posterior superior parts of BA 17 and 18 and in the right
hippocampus and amygdala.
Similarities and differences between guessing and
passive observation. The comparison of activity between
guessing and passive observation is rendered more difficult by
the fact that they were acquired in separate sessions, and results
should be considered with care. Counterbalancing the order of
acquisition would however have interfered with the aims of the
experiments for two reasons. First, an instruction not to engage in
active guessing would be even more difficult during a passive
observation trial if participants would know that they later need to
guess the meaning of the same movie. Second, capturing the
neural processes involved in interpreting gestures in an ecologically
plausible way would be disturbed by ‘passively’ viewing the movies
before. Using different movies for passive observation and active
guessing would not be a solution either because the stimuli might
differ in important ways.
To exclude the possibility that differences in brain activity
between guessing and passive observation could simply be due to
systematic differences in the state of the scanner, we additionally
compared the mean fMRI signal between the two sessions (using a
two-sample t-test comparing the globals in the two sessions, see
Methods). No region in the brain showed such an effect under a
threshold of p,0.05 (FDR corrected). This means that functional
differences cannot be due to differences in the mean signal alone.
Two analyses were then performed to compare brain activity
during the processing of the same movies during active guessing
versus passive observation: one to map differences and one to map
similarities between the two conditions. Areas, which were
recruited to a greater extent during guessing than during passive
observation were as follows: the inferior and middle temporal gyri
and areas V5/MT+bilaterally, and more anterior in the brain a
cluster in BA 44. Again, inspection of the medial wall (see Figure 4)
showed no clusters of activation in the mPFC ROI associated with
theory-of-mind. Differences due to a greater involvement during
passive observation than during guessing were located in the
angular gyrus and the precuneus. These were areas that were
deactivated compared to the passive baseline in the main effects. A
full description and visualization of the areas can be found in
Table S4 and Figure 1D. In contrast, much larger areas were
recruited during both active guessing and passive observation
without significant difference between these conditions. These
included the precentral gyrus (BA 6) and BA 44 and 45, the
somatosensory cortex (BA2), the inferior parietal lobule, and the
middle and superior temporal areas. For a full description and
visualization of the areas, see Table S5 and Figure 1E.
Guessing masked with gesturing, passive observation
masked with gesturing (shared circuits). We defined shared
circuits as voxels recruited both during the execution and the
observation of gestures. Masking the activity during guessing with
the activity during gesturing shows, among others, shared
recruitment of the following areas: the precentral gyrus (BA 6)
extending into the inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44 and 45), the
primary somatosensory cortex (BA2 in particular), the middle and
superior temporal areas and the supramarginal gyri. Roughly the
same pattern emerges when the activity during observing is
masked with the activity during gesturing. Figures 1F and 1G
detail these activations.
Similarities and differences between guessing and
passive observation masked with gesturing. Contrasting
active guessing with passive observation and masking this with the
activation during gesturing shows noticeable peaks in the right
inferior parietal lobule and in the left BA 44 (Fig. 1H).
Substantially larger areas remain when the activity that is
present during both active guessing and passive observation is
masked with activity during gesturing, without there being a
significant difference between these conditions. These include
much of the somatosensory, premotor, middle temporal- and
supramarginal cortex (Fig. 1I).
Regions of Interest fMRI Results
Putative mirror neuron system (Figure 2). The bar plot of
the parameter estimates during the different conditions show that
all conditions activate all putative mirror neuron areas significantly
even at an uncorrected threshold of P,0.001. The time courses
show further that all areas are substantially activated during the
whole period of each condition (as evidenced by the mean activity
exceeding the confidence interval (dashed line) of the mean activity
during the 5 volumes prior to stimulus onset). Two of these areas
make a significant distinction between guessing and passive
observation, but only under an uncorrected threshold of
P,0.05. These areas are the right parietal cortex and the left
ventral premotor cortex.
Putative theory-of-mind areas (Figure 3). The medial
prefrontal cortex shows no significant response to any of the
conditions when applying an uncorrected threshold of P,0.001, in
contrast to the temporo-parietal junction. The time courses
confirm this observation: activation almost never reaches
significantly above the baseline activity, except at the end of a
movie during the passive observation condition. The temporo-
parietal junction is recruited significantly during both guessing and
passive observation, but not during gesturing. This is also
confirmed in its time courses.
Discussion
In this experiment romantically involved couples played the
game of charades in the scanner, taking turns as either the sender
(gesturing) or receiver (guessing) of gestures. In this motivating
context, they very naturally generated and decoded novel gestures
with a communicative intention. The main goals of the study were
to investigate to what extent (a) the pMNS for transitive hand
actions and (b) pToM areas are involved in deliberate commu-
nication through gestures, and (c) how dependent the activity in
these areas is on the communicative intention induced by the task.
We analyzed the involvement of these two networks in two ways:
through a whole-brain and a region-of-interest (ROI) analysis.
Both analyses gave similar results. The pMNS does indeed become
activated during communication through gestures, with highly
overlapping brain areas involved in sending and receiving the
gestural message. In contrast, the most typical of pToM areas, the
anterior rostral medial frontal cortex associated with theory-of-
mind [78] (which we will refer to as mPFC) was not recruited
beyond baseline levels during either sending or receiving gestural
messages; the TPJ was engaged during observation but not during
gesturing. The pMNS and TPJ were significantly activated both
during guessing and passive viewing. The hypothesis that the TPJ
would only be activated during the guessing conditions that
explicitly encourages decoding the mental states (i.e. what is he
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was not confirmed.
Involvement of the putative mirror neuron system
Our study shows that brain regions associated with the pMNS
for goal-directed, transitive actions were recruited during gestural
communication - even when physical objects are not being
present. A whole-brain analysis, in which the execution of gestures
is used to mask the guessing or passive observation of gestures,
shows a large overlap between the areas recruited in the three
conditions (Fig. 1F,G). Furthermore, the ROI analysis of the
pMNS, as defined using actions directed at objects [39], shows
sustained activity in these areas during the whole period of
gesturing, guessing and passive observation (Fig. 2). Combining
the study of Gazzola, Rizzolatti et al. [39] with the results of the
current study show that the same set of voxels in the brain is
therefore involved in (a) mapping the object-directed hand actions
of others onto the neural substrates involved in executing similar
object-directed hand actions and (b) mapping the gestures of
others onto the neural substrates involved in executing similar
gestures. This extends previous findings [57] by showing that even
in the absence of imitation trials, and during a genuinely
communicative task, the brain regions associated with the pMNS
for goal-directed actions are consistently activated. See online
Supporting Information (Text S1) for a discussion of how this
finding relates to the question of whether the pMNS requires
objects to be activated.
To maintain the flow of the game, control conditions involving
the static vision of hands or meaningless hand actions were not
included in this study. One might therefore question whether the
activity found in the ROIs during gesture viewing (guessing or
passive observation) is specific to actions or whether it reflects
unspecific attentional resources. The ROIs used to extract thesignal
in the pMNS have been extensively examined in our laboratory
using the same scanner and analysis software [21,32,39]. Figure S1
(see online Supporting Information) illustrates the peak percent
signal changes of the time courses measured in Gazzola, Rizzolatti
et al. [39, their Fig. S3] and those observed during the same time
period of the gesture condition in the present experiment. Doing so
revealed that activations in the guessing condition here exceeded
those of the control conditions of Gazzola, Rizzolatti et al., [39] in
all but the right ventral premotor ROI. Indeed, in the same ROIs,
the activity inthe present experiment often exceeded even thevision
of goal directed actions in all but the right ventral premotor ROI.
Although comparisons across experiments are problematic and
should be interpreted with caution, this does suggest that the activity
during the viewing of gestures in the present experiment reflects
genuine action processing that exceeds that during the sight of mere
movements.
Interestingly, the brain activity induced while engaged in active
guessing overlapped considerably with that obtained during the
second showing of the exact same visual stimuli but without the
task (Fig. 1F,G). As noted in the results, quantitative comparisons
across different sessions are problematic, and conclusions drawn
from these comparisons have to be considered with care. A
quantitative comparison between activity in the two conditions
within the confines of regions involved in gesture production
however did reveal significantly higher BOLD during active
guessing compared to passive viewing. The areas particularly
involved were BA44 and the MTG (Fig. 1H). These differences are
unlikely to be due to systematic differences in the sensitivity of the
scanner, as there were no significant differences in these areas
between the globals extracted by the general linear model on the
two scanning days (see methods). These differences were also
marginal compared to the much more extensive network of
premotor, parietal and temporal regions of the pMNS that did not
show a significant difference between the two tasks (Fig. 1I). This
finding is in line with a previous study which showed that the
pMNS for facial movements is only marginally affected by task
[75]. A number of studies [80,81] have shown that observing other
people’s behaviour interferes with the observer’s own movements
even if it would be beneficial for the observer to ignore the
movements of the other person. We believe that the similarity
between the activity in passive viewing and active guessing, and
the fact that both significantly activate the pMNS, highlights the
tendency of the pMNS and/or the subjects to process the actions
of others even if the experimenter’s instructions do not explicitly
encourage them to do so. With ‘and/or the subject’ we refer to the
fact that upon debriefing, some of our participants reported
finding it hard to refrain entirely from interpreting the gestures in
the passive viewing condition. They did report however, that they
interpreted the actions more during the guessing condition.
It should be noted that activation of the pMNS regions during
gesture observation and production can, but does not have to
reflect activity in mirror neurons within these voxels. This is
because a voxel involved in two tasks could contain a population of
neurons involved in both, as has been shown in the monkey
[15,16,17] and/or two distinct populations, each of which being
involved in only one of the two tasks, interdigitated within the
volume of the voxel [21].
Involvement of Theory-of-Mind areas
Because playing charades could require the explicit guessing of
the communicative mental state of the gesturer (‘‘what was he
trying to tell me?’’), our second experimental question was whether
pToM areas, including the mPFC and the TPJ, would be
significantly recruited during the gesturing, active guessing and/
or passive viewing.
Medial Prefrontal Cortex. Previous studies have shown
that mentalizing is associated with activity in the mPFC
[58,59,63,64,65,71,82,83,84]. More specifically, Sommer et al.
[69] showed that true belief reasoning (which might be closer to
what participants need to do here compared to false-belief
reasoning) involves the mPFC. Furthermore, Kampe, Frith, &
Frith [85], as well as Walter et al. [71], and Ciaramidaro et al. [60]
found the anterior paracingulate cortex to be recruited while
recognizing the communicative intentions of others [for reviews
see 62,78]. In our experiment, neither the ROI nor the whole
brain analysis revealed activations above baseline in the mPFC
during any of the conditions. This was true using a threshold of
p,0.001, and for the ROI analysis at using p,0.01 (see Fig. 3).
This negative finding suggests that the mPFC may not play an
active role in gestural communication. This finding seems different
from Gallagher & Frith’s [72] conclusions that the left anterior
paracingulate cortex was selectively more involved in recognizing
gestures expressing inner states. This difference may be due to the
fact that our gestures referred to objects (nutcracker) and object-
directed actions (riding a bicycle) while Gallagher & Frith’s
expressive gestures referred to inner states (I feel cold). Thinking
about the inner states of others is indeed known to be particularly
effective at triggering mPFC activity [78].
We asked participants to consider the movies of their partner’s
actions for at least 50 seconds before reporting their interpretation
of the gestures. This requirement was established to ascertain
sufficient data points to examine the time course of activity. A
consequence of this requirement, however, is the participants may
have guessed the meaning of the gestures early in the trial, and
before they gave their answer. Could the lack of mPFC activity in
Charades: Role of MNS and ToM
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6801the whole-brain and ROI analysis be due to these trials? We
believe not. If this were the case, the time course extracted from
the mPFC ROI during the guessing condition should exceed the
baseline activity or that during observation condition at least early
in the trial. Our data (Fig. 3) does not support this hypothesis.
It should be note however, that all conditions in our experiment
were compared against a passive baseline. It has been argued that
a seemingly passive baseline actually goes hand-in-hand with
increased metabolism in the mPFC [86], possibly because of self
referential processing. Such default, self-referential activity would
have been suspended by our tasks, leading to a decrease in mPFC
activity that may have masked mentalizing processes of compar-
atively smaller metabolic demands.
Temporal Parietal Junction. We found that the TPJ was
significantly activated during guessing and passive observation but
not gesturing. The TPJ has been associated with the ability to
mentalize [68,87,88,89], but other studies suggest that this
involvement might reflect attentional reorientation necessary for
mentalizing rather than mentalizing per se [73,74]. It therefore
remains unclear what can be deduced from its activation in some
of our conditions. It might be that activity truly reflects
mentalizing [90], suggesting that the decoding of gestures but
not their generation requires mentalizing. What sheds doubt on
this interpretation is that during mentalizing tasks, the TPJ
typically coactivates with mPFC, and this coactivation may be
more unique for mentalizing than the activity of either region
taken alone. Alternatively, activity in the TPJ may reflect
attentional reorienting [73,74] (for instance between the gestures
as an outer stimulus and the hypothesis about their meaning as an
inner stimulus), which gesture interpretation may share with
mentalizing. Finally, some have interpreted TPJ activity during the
attribution of agency [74], an interpretation that would match our
finding TPJ activity only during to the third person conditions
(guessing and passive observation) Further experiments are needed
to disentangle these alternatives.
Conclusions
The putative mirror neuron system (pMNS) is recruited by
observing communicative gestures (both with and without an
instruction to interpret) and by the production of similar gestures.
In contrast, the mPFC, which is often associated with mentalizing
and ToM, was not recruited above baseline during gestural
communication. Finally the TPJ, which is associated with
mentalizing but also attention reorienting and the attribution of
agency, was recruited during both passive observation and
guessing. This suggests that observing gestures recruits a
combination of TPJ and pMNS both when participants actively
decode gestures and when they passively watch them. The pMNS
- but not the TPJ - is recruited during the generation of similar
gestures. These findings are in accordance with the idea that
gestural communication could build upon a pMNS for goal-
directed hand actions [6,7]. The pMNS could create a simulated
first person perspective of the gestures through a combination of
forward and reverse models in the somatosensory and motor
domain [21]. This simulation could then provide additional
information for associating the vision of gestures to their meaning.
Evidence for mentalizing during gestural communication in this
experiment is weak however. During gesture interpretation, TPJ
activity could reflect the fact that information from the pMNS
could feed into pToM components (the TPJ) [9,10,11], but it is
unclear why the mPFC would not have been active if activity truly
reflects mentalizing. During gesture generation, neither the TPJ
nor the mPFC were active above baseline. Alternatively, TPJ
activity during gestural interpretation may reflect the attribution of
agency to the action representations in the pMNS [74].
We have introduced the game of charades in neuroimaging
research as a motivating social game to study gestural communi-
cation. This provides a new tool to study the involvement of
pMNS in a genuinely communicational context. By extending this
method to study virtual or neurological lesions it can be
determined whether these regions play a necessary role in
understanding and generating communicative gestures. A number
of studies using gesturing tasks have found impairments in gesture
recognition following motor skill impairment [91,92,93]. This
suggests that the pMNS may indeed play a critical role. A recent
study [92] shows that premotor and parietal lesions that impair
hand action execution (as compared to mouth action execution)
selectively impair the recognition of hand gestures (and their
sounds). This confirms that lesions in the pMNS can selectively
affect the production and perception of particular motor programs.
This finding would be expected if simulation were important in
gestural communication given that the pMNS is roughly
somatotopically organized [22,38,94,95]. Nevertheless, although
gesture recognition is impaired in apraxic patients, performance
typically remains substantially above chance level, suggesting that
the pMNS cannot be the only route to associate gestures with
meaning. Understanding the complementary nature of various
sources of information within the brain during gestural commu-
nication will be an important focus of future research [9,10,11].
Supporting Information
Text S1 Does the MNS need objects to be activated? Some
studies have investigated whether the MNS can respond to actions
not directed at objects. In this supporting information we discuss
the question whether the current study can provide further insights
into this question.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.s001 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Figure S1 Comparison with Gazzola et al., 2007. Comparison of
mean percent signal change during gesture observation (light and
dark blue bars) with those during the observation of goal directed
actions (red and orange, Gazzola et al., 2007). The blocks of action
observation differed across experiments: over 50 s in the current
experiment and 13.5 seconds in Gazzola et al., 2007. Instead of
comparing parameter estimates over the entire period of observa-
tion, we therefore extracted the mean percent signal change at the
moment (16 s) in which activity to the shorter of the two blocks
(Gazzola et al., 2007) peaked. The bar graphs represent the mean
percent signal change at 16 s poststimulus onset (6s.e.m.) separately
for Guessing (dark blue) and Passive Observation (light blue) from
the current study and for the observation of a hand manipulating an
object (red) and a hand moving to rest on a table without
manipulating an object (orange) from the data of Gazzola et al.,
2007. ROIs are shown in the centre.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.s002 (7.51 MB TIF)
Table S1 Activation table for Guessing - Baseline. Table
specifying for each supra-threshold cluster of activation during the
contrast Guessing-Baseline, the t-value, location, anatomical
description and, when available, probabilistically determined
Brodmann area according to the anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al.,
2005).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.s003 (0.02 MB
XLS)
Table S2 Activation table for Passive Observation - Baseline -
Table specifying for each supra-threshold cluster of activation
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location, anatomical description and, when available, probabilis-
tically determined Brodmann area according to the anatomy
toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.s004 (0.02 MB
XLS)
Table S3 Activation table for Gesturing - Baseline. Table
specifying for each supra-threshold cluster of activation during the
contrast Gesturing-Baseline, the t-value, location, anatomical
description and, when available, probabilistically determined
Brodmann area according to the anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al.,
2005).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.s005 (0.01 MB
XLS)
Table S4 Activation table for Guessing - Passive Observation.
Table specifying for each supra-threshold cluster of activation
during the contrast Guessing-Passive Observation, the t-value,
location, anatomical description and, when available, probabilis-
tically determined Brodmann area according to the anatomy
toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.s006 (0.01 MB
XLS)
Table S5 Activation table for Guessing equals Passive Observa-
tion. Table specifying for each supra-threshold cluster of activation
during the contrast Guessing equals Passive Observation, the t-
value, location, anatomical description and, when available,
probabilistically determined Brodmann area according to the
anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.s007 (0.02 MB
XLS)
Movie S1 Example of a gesture recording. Example of the
recorded gesture ‘boardgame’.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006801.s008 (7.73 MB
MOV)
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